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Landowners are commonly not only better informed about their private cost of 
conservation than conservation agencies, but also frequently in a position to spend 
resources on improving their knowledge about contract-relevant parameters before 
signing a contract on offer. We extend and generalize the literature on conservation 
contracting by endogenizing the information structure in a setting where the 
conservation agency is both asymmetrically informed about the efficiency of the 
landowner and unable to observe whether the landowner  collects information after 
being offered the contract and before signing it. In this setting, we study the optimal 
contract the conservation agency should offer to the landowner conditional on the cost 
of information collection. This contract needs to balance moral hazard and adverse 
selection problems since by encouraging a landowner  to collect information, the 
conservation agency simultaneously increases the landowner’s incentive to misreport 
his ‘type’. We term this the ‘information rent effect’. Due to its presence, the terms of 
conservation contracts have to be significantly altered relative to a contract offered 
based on exogenous information structure or a contract based purely on information 
collection. 
 
Keywords: Conservation; Contracts; Asymmetric Information; Information 
Collection;  
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  21. Introduction 
1.1. Information management in conservation contracting 
With the expansion of conservation activities on private lands, the relationship 
between conservation agencies and landowners has become a major focus of attention 
in the economics of conservation (cf. Shogren and Tschirhart 2001). One increasingly 
popular instrument available to conservation agencies for managing this relationship 
are conservation contracts (OECD 1999). A common theme in the literature on the 
design of such contracts is the observation that landowners are commonly better 
informed about their private cost of conservation than conservation agencies. This 
realization has given rise to the design of conservation contracts that ensure efficiency 
by taking this pre-contractual information asymmetry into consideration (Smith and 
Shogren 2002, Moxey et al. 1999, Wu and Babcock 1996, Smith 1995). Related to 
such information asymmetries is another, but quite distinct observation. This is that 
landowners are not only better informed about contract-relevant parameters, they are 
also frequently in a position to improve – at a cost – on their information before 
signing a contract offered to them by the conservation agency. When present, this 
asymmetry in the ability to gather information has important implications for contract 
design. This is because information collection by an agent before signing a contract 
gives rise to endogenous information structures that require additional features to be 
added in optimal contract design (Laffont and Martimort 2002, Crémer et al. 1998, 
Crémer and Khalil 1992).  
In our view, it is a characteristic of a significant number of conservation contracting 
situations that both types of asymmetry described above will be present at once. This 
will be true particularly in settings where conservation contracts are either a novel 
instrument or exhibit significant heterogeneity. The reason is that while it is plausible, 
  3on the one hand, to assume that landowners will possess some superior information 
about the private cost of participating in a particular contract, they will, on the other 
hand, usually not find it economical to become perfectly informed about the exact 
cost of fulfilling their contractual commitments prior to a particular contract being 
offered. Once a specific contract can be considered by the landowner, however, it can 
be shown that there will be conditions under which it will be rational to improve on 
the informational status by gathering additional information.  
Information gathering by landowners is welfare-relevant for at least three reasons: If 
the information so collected is productive, both conservation agency and landowner  
have a joint interest in it being collected to improve efficiency of production. Since 
information collection is usually costly, however, encouraging information collection 
is not always socially desirable. Thirdly, since information collection can usually not 
be observed and the landowner does not need to share new information with the 
conservation agency, information collection can increase the landowner’s existing 
strategic advantage of pre-contractual information asymmetry and hence his ability to 
extract additional rents from the conservation agency. These three basic 
considerations point to the need to design the conservation contract in a way that 
efficiently manages the trade-off between encouraging and deterring information 
collection by the landowner  after the contract has been offered. This paper provides a 
characterisation of the optimal contract in such a setting.  
 
1.2. Contribution 
Previous papers have considered the problem of information collection, both in the 
context of conservation contracting and more generally. Polasky and Doremus (1998) 
and Polasky (2001) consider the case of how conservation agencies can gather 
biological information on private lands to determine the optimal extent of restrictions 
  4on land use as well as the optimal level of compensation. In these models, agreeing to 
information collection is voluntary while participation in conservation is not. By 
contrast, in our setting the landowner ’s participation in conservation is purely 
voluntary.  
The general contracting literature has considered both the cases of strategic
1 (Crémer 
et al. 1996, Crémer and Khalil 1992) and productive
2 information gathering (Laffont 
and Martimort 2002, Crémer et al., 1998a, Lewis and Sappington 1997)
3. Information 
is productive in our model, but we extend the existing literature by studying contracts 
that are also robust with respect to pre-contractual asymmetry. Specifically, we differ 
from Laffont and Martimort (2002, 395ff.) in considering a continuum of agents and a 
different timing of the game and from Lewis and Sappington (1988) by excluding ex-
post cost observability. One restriction of the analysis is that it focuses on cases in 
which types are sufficiently distinct or – differently put – exogenous information 
asymmetry is ‘large’ relative to new information. We return to this point below.   
By considering the – from our point of view, highly realistic – combination of 
information asymmetry and information gathering, our model is a first attempt to 
include endogenous information structures in the analysis of conservation contracts. 
As a result, we are able to study some interesting contract design problems that do not 
arise when information and ability asymmetry are analyzed in isolation.  
                                                 
1 Strategic information gathering refers to situations where the information is obtained freely after the 
contract is signed. Pre-signing information gathering is therefore carried out purely for bargaining 
reasons (see Crémer et al 1998a). 
2 Productive information gathering refers to situations where the information must be acquired for a 
cost even after signing the contract. (again, see Crémer et al, 1998a). 
3 Cremer et al. (1998a) analyse a continuous-type Baron and Myerson (1982) model with adverse 
selection and endogenize the regulator ’s choice of whether to induce or deter costly information 
acquisition.  They show that when information acquisition cost is high enough, regulator  would deter 
information acquisition by offering a fixed-amount fixed-payment contract. Lewis and Sappington 
(1997) study contracts that encourage precontractual cost information collection in the two-type case 
with unobservable effort.  They extend the standard procurement model to examine how an landowner 
is optimally induced to acquire information and show that concerns about information acquisition cause 
  5What is the nature of the problem? From the point of view of the conservation agency, 
there are considerable benefits from inducing the landowner  to collect information in 
order to improve production efficiency. As a complication, moral hazard problems 
arise since the action of information acquisition is unobservable by the agency.  The 
contract needs to ensure therefore that it will be in the landowner’s interest to collect 
information if that increases the efficiency of production. In our context, sufficient 
information rent has to be offered to compensate for the cost of information 
acquisition. In line with Cremer et al. (1998a), the optimal conservation contract 
balances the information rent, as a function of the cost of acquisition, and the 
improvement in efficiency.     
The counterweight to the efficiency gains generated by information gathering is that 
in the absence of ex-post observability, the conservation agency has to design the 
contract in an incentive-compatible way in order to make landowners reveal their 
private cost of conservation.  As information acquisition is not observable by the 
agency, information rents must be offered to overcome the implicit moral hazard 
problem. However, we find that – as a general rule – increasing information rents in 
the interest of encouraging information acquisition will worsen the adverse selection 
problem. Specifically, raising the information rent for low efficiency landowners 
makes it more attractive for high efficiency landowners to misreport their type.  
The core contribution of this paper is to characterize the conservation contract that 
optimally trades off moral hazard and adverse selection when the landowner is both 
better informed and able to get better informed still. Depending on the cost of 
information acquisition, the optimal contract is designed to encourage the landowner 
to collect information when appropriate, while at the same time controlling the 
                                                                                                                                            
important changes in standard incentive contracts.  Reward structures with extreme financial payoffs 
  6information rent to prevent untruthful revelation of the information. It turns out that 
the terms of such contract will differ significantly from contracts derived for 
exogenous information structures or for incentivizing information collection. 
The structure of the paper is as follows: In the next section, we describe a 
simple model of endogenous information structures with precontractual information 
asymmetry.  In section 3 we give as benchmarks special cases of our problem for 
which solutions already exist in the literature, then present and contrast with these 
solutions the main results of our generalized model. In section 4, we develop the 
specific contract terms given our contracting situation. In section 5, we discuss the 
main findings, suggest possible extensions and conclude.  
 
2. The Model  
2.1. Model set-up 
The set-up of the model is similar to Cremer et. al. (1998a), but differs in its 
information structure. A risk-neutral conservation agency (thereafter, ‘the regulator’) 
contracts with a risk-neutral landowner for the production of a positive amount q of 
conservation effort, such as the amount of land retired. The amount produced 
q∈[0,+∞ [ is publicly observable.  
The regulator. Net of transfer T  to the agent, the regulator  earns – ex post – a net 
benefit  ( ) ≡− GV q T . The benefit function V is concave and twice differentiable on 
[0, +∞ [ with V’ > 0, V” < 0, and V’’’ > 0 and satisfies Inada’s conditions 
[V’(0)=+∞, V’(+∞)=0].   
The landowner. The landowner’s net payoff U from accepting the contract is – ex 
post – the transfer T received from the regulator  minus the cost of producing q, such 
                                                                                                                                            
arise, and super-high-powered contracts are coupled with contracts that entail pronounced cost sharing. 
  7that  . The payoff from not accepting the contract is zero. Information 
asymmetry arises from the fact that there are two types of agents in the market: high 
efficiency agents (type H) and low efficiency agents (type L).  Let B
≡− UTB q
H (BL) denote 
high (low) efficiency landowner’s efficiency parameter in the cost function and BH  < 
B L. There is a probability λ∈[0,1] that the landowner is of the high efficiency type. 
The landowner’s marginal cost Bi consists of two components: The first is the 
efficiency parameter βi which is privately known to the landowner only. This gives 
rise to status asymmetry. The second is a parameter θi denoting the state of the world 
which is unknown to both regulator and landowner at the outset, but which the 
landowner can find out in return for paying r. This gives rise to ability asymmetry. 
The marginal cost is additive in both parameters such that Bi = βi + θi . For simplicity 
assume that θ i is uniformly distributed [θ ,θ ] with E(θi) = 0. θH and θL are assumed 
to be drawn from the same distribution, so the subscripts are dropped subsequently. 
Note that even though the realization of state of world θ can be different for type H 
and type L, in the interest of tractability we restrict attention to a setting in which high 
and low efficiency agents are sufficiently distinct such that βL > βH + θ . This implies 
that a producer who observes his type to be H prior to collecting information will be 
more efficient under the worst case of the world than the average low-efficiency 
producer: Exogenous information asymmetry is – loosely speaking – ‘important’ 
relative to new information. We come back to this point in section 5.  
 
2.2. Direct revelation game 
Following Cremer et al. (1998a), we assume that if the regulator encourages 
acquisition of θ, he offers the landowner a schedule Ti(qi (θ)) that links payment to 
  8production, where qi (θ) is a function of the true and known cost Bi, which includes 
information on both θ and βi.   On the other hand, if the regulator discourages the 
landowner from acquiring θ, the contract can be described by a pair (Ti, qi), in which 
case production qi is a function of type βi only. 
 
2.3. Information structure and timing 
The timing is as in Crémer et al.(1998a), but has an endogenous information structure: 
•  At date 0, nature selects the marginal cost Bi, which consists of two 
components: βi which is known to the landowner privately and θ , which is 
unknown to both at the outset. Recall that Bi = βi + θ . 
•  At date 1, the regulator offers a contract to the landowner. The form of the 
contract follows a direct revelation mechanism. If the regulator encourages 
information collection, the contract takes forms of Ti(qi (θ)) where the 
production and payment will relate to both  βi and θ.  If the regulator 
discourages information collection, the contract will take form of (Ti, qi) 
where production and payment are only based on  βi. 
•  At date 2, the landowner chooses whether or not to collect information. The 
cost of information collection, r, is common knowledge. Information 
collection is not observable by the regulator and therefore non-contractable. 
•   At date 3, the landowner decides whether to accept or refuse the contract.  If 
the contract is refused, the game is over.   
•  At date 4, if the landowner accepts the contract, he chooses an output level q 
and receives the transfer T specified in the contract.  
Note that the landowner has an opportunity to collect information θ (date 2) after the 
contract is offered (date 1) but before signing the contract (date 3) and producing 
  9(date 4). Knowledge of θ provides information about the true marginal cost before 
production, and therefore improves efficiency. In this sense, gathering information θ 
is “productive”.  
 
2.4. Strategies and payoffs 
The regulator may or may not choose to induce information acquisition. If he does, 
output will be sensitive to the true cost of production  β θ = + ii B . Therefore with 




On the other hand, if the landowner has been deterred from acquiring information, 
production will be independent of θ and therefore independent of Bi.  The optimal 
contract can be described by a pair (Ti, qi). Without information acquisition, the 
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The contracts offered must be incentive compatible in the sense that - when 
offered Ti(qi (θ))- the landowner  should prefer to become informed, and - when 
offered (Ti, qi)- he should prefer not to become informed. It follows from the 
revelation principle that if the landowner has acquired information, the regulator will 
find it optimal to have the landowner announce the value of Bi, and to base the 
production and payment on this announcement.  
 
  103. Optimal Contract Choice  
The specific set-up of our model suggests three special cases. The first is where 
0 θ ≡ , the second is where  , and the third is where  0 ≡ r 1 or 0 λ ≡ . For these special 
cases, the optimal contract terms are available from the literature. The first case is 
familiar as the simple version of precontractual information asymmetry with two 
discrete types of agents, also known as the ‘basic’ model in the textbook literature 
(Laffont and Martimore 2002, Laffont and Tirole 1993). In the second case, our 
model effectively collapses into the Baron-Myerson (1982) model (BM hereafter) 
with a continuum of agents. Lastly, in the third case the model is identical to the 
Cremer et. al.(1998a) model (CKR hereafter) where on the outset of contract both the 
regulator and the landowner are equally informed, but the landowner has better ability 
to collect information by incurring a cost r. These well-known results are important 
benchmarks against which we contrast our findings about what happens when pre-
contractual asymmetry and costly information acquisition interact.  
 
3.1. Benchmark Model 1: θ ≡ 0 
If θ ≡ 0, the only information asymmetry remaining in the model is precontractual, 
which corresponds to a standard problem with two types of landowners. The optimal 
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The classic conclusion is that in this setting, the contract should be designed such that 
the low-efficiency landowner under-produces and receives no rent, while the high 
  11efficiency landowner produces at the efficient level and receives an information rent. 
We will make extensive use of the benchmark output contracted,  , below. 
** ** and  L q H q
 
3.2. Benchmark Model 2: r ≡ 0 
If information can be collected at zero cost, i.e. r = 0, our model collapses into 
the classic BM model. Consider the simplified case where there exists only one type 
of landowner, i.e.λ = 1 or 0. Like in BM therefore, the regulator faces a landowner of 
a continuous type (with unit costs between β+θ and β+θ ) with the true type private 
information of the landowner only. The solution to the BM model is: 
()









where f(θ) and F(θ) are the probability density and cumulative probability functions 
of θ.  The BM contract is designed such that at the optimum the contracted production 
yields a marginal utility to the regulator which is equal to the marginal cost to the 







.  So with the exception of the 
best state of the world, i.e. θ=θ, the post-contractual situation is characterised by 
underproduction.  
 
3.3. Benchmark Model 3: λ = 1/0 
If λ = 1 or 0, there is no pre-contractual asymmetry, but only the landowner can 
collect information at cost r. This is the set-up in CKR’s classic paper. Their 
conclusion is that depending on how costly it is to compensate the landowner for his 
effort in collecting information, the regulator might find optimal to offer either a fixed 
quantity - fixed payment (FQ-FP) contract (q,T) based on expected cost, which deters 
  12the landowner from collecting information, or a BM-type incentive contract with 
additional compensation for the landowner’s information acquisition activity, which  
encourages information acquisition. Figure 1 illustrates their main result. When r< r*, 
the optimal contract is a BM type incentive contract which encourages information 
collection and revelation.  When r > r*, the optimal contract to offer is a FQ-FP 
contract that deters information collection.  
 
Figure 1: Ability Asymmetry: CKR Model 
 
Information 
Collection cost r 
r* 
Fixed quantity and fixed 




Modified or Unmodified BM 
contract that encourages 
information collection 
 
As we will show, this result only holds for the special case of one type of 
landowner. Adding a second type of landowner to the model makes substantial 
difference in terms of the types of contract offered as well as the specific contract 
terms. In CKR, the only rationale for the regulator to switch from encouraging to 
deterring information collection is that the landowner’s information collection cost r 
is too high to compensate.  In a generalized model, however, there are additional 
concerns about the choice of contract type. As we will show in detail later, 
encouraging information collection also encourages landowners, in particular high-
efficiency landowners, to misreport their type. However, offering the high-efficiency 
landowner an incentive compatible contract for revealing his true type is much more 
costly if the low efficiency landowner is encouraged to collect information. In a 
generalized model, these potential interactions between two types of agents 
  13compound the information collection cost in driving the regulator’s choice between 
contract types.  We demonstrate this in the following subsection.  
 
3.4. Main result 
Under precontractual asymmetry and endogenous information structures, there are 
four types of contracts available to the principal. The first is a contract type that deters 
both types of agents from collecting information and is denoted as PNN. The second 
type induces both types of agents to collect information, a problem referred to as PII.  
The third types induces only the high-efficiency landowner to collect information, a 
problem denoted by PNI. The last type of contract induces only the low-efficiency 
landowner to collect information, a problem denoted by PIN. The regulator ’s utility in 
offering four types of contracts is denoted by GNN, GII, GNI, and GIN respectively. 
Here we characterize the regulator’s optimal choice across the four different types of 
contracts. Section 4 discusses the optimal terms of these contracts.  
  The first result, contained in Lemma 1, states that only three of the four 
possible contract types will ever be considered by the regulator.  
 
Lemma 1: For each given information collection cost r, there exists a feasible 
contract PNI  that is preferable to PIN by the principal.  
Proof: See Appendix A. 
 
The intuition for Lemma 1 lies in the asymmetric nature of the “information rent 
effect”.  The information rent is the rent that the regulator has to pay to encourage the 
landowner to collecting information. This rent is different for type H and type L: For 
contract type PNI, the terms only have to ensure that the information rent paid to type 
  14H under the most unfavourable situation (βH+ θ ) is incentive compatible with the 
transfer to type L (βL). In other words, the information rent paid to type H under PNI 
will generally not impact significantly on the size of the transfer (TL) to type L. 
However, the converse does not hold for PIN. Compared to PNI, PIN generally leads to 
a significant increase in the information rent going to landowners because for the 
contract to be incentive compatible, it has to pay as much information rent for type H 
(βH) as for type L under the most favourable situation (βL+ θ). This is to say, every 
penny paid as information rent to type L will increase the transfer (TH) to type H.  
Therefore PNI, the contract that induces type H to collect information, strictly 
dominates PIN. 
  Given that only three contract types need ever be considered by Lemma 1, 
Proposition 1 contains the rule by which the regulator optimally chooses between the 
three contract types as a function of r. 
 
Proposition 1: Denote the regulator’s optimal contract and associated utility as Gopt. 
Gopt can be characterized by two critical levels of r: r1 and r2, where r2  ≥  r1:   
  For r < r1, Gopt = GII 
  For r1 ≤ r ≤  r2, Gopt = GNI  
  For r > r2, Gopt = GNN 
Proof: See Appendix A. 
Proposition 1 shows that for a high information acquisition cost (r > r2), it is 
optimal to offer both types of agents FQ-FP contracts that deter both from collecting 
information. For all r1 ≤ r ≤  r2, a FQ-FP contract is offered to type L to deter 
information acquisition and a BM contract to type H to encourage information 
collection. For r < r1, BM contracts are offered to both types of agents to encourage 
  15information acquisition. We develop the specific terms of these contracts in the 
Section 4. The Figure 2 illustrates the essential features of the choice of contract types 
indexed by the cost of gathering information.   
 
Figure 2: Dual Information Asymmetry 
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Collection cost r 
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The difference between Proposition 1, illustrated in Figure 2, and the main 
results of CKR, illustrated in Figure 1, can be understood in two ways. First, in 
contrast with CKR’s result where choice of the contract type depends exclusively on 
the information collection cost r, in the more general setting it also depends on 
landowner’s efficiency type. For intermediate information collection cost, the 
regulator encourages information collection by type H and deters that activity by type 
L. There are two reasons for this asymmetric treatment: First of all, type H has greater 
use for the information since it can be used both to misreport its type and to decide on 
the rejection of the contract. By comparison, type L can use the information only to 
reject the contract (as he would never have incentive to misreport his type and to 
understate his marginal cost!). It is therefore more difficult to deter type H from 
collecting information.  Secondly, any information rent paid to type L requires the 
information rent paid to type H to increase to prevent misreporting by the latter. The 
  16converse, however, is not true. This makes inducing the less efficient agent to collect 
information particularly unattractive from the regulator’s point of view.  
Second, the threshold level of r* at which the optimal contract type is 
switched in CKR becomes very different when there is more than one type of 
landowner. Due to the “information rent effect”, this threshold point is further pushed 
toward the direction of zero (infinity) if there exists a more (less) efficient agent. In 
other words, if there exists a more efficient type of agent, this threshold is pushed 
toward zero and a FQ-FP contract is more plausible. Conversely, the threshold is 
pushed toward the direction of infinity and an incentive contract that encourages 
information acquisition is more plausible when there possibly exists a less efficient 
type agent.   
After having characterized the optimal choice across contract types as a 
functon of r, we now study the precise terms of the contract types on offer.  
 
4. Optimal Contracts with Information Acquisition Constraints  
Proposition 1 specifies three types of contracts indexed by information collection cost 
r under dual information asymmetry. In this section we derive the optimal contract 
terms for each type, PNN, PII and PNI, in the presence of both precontractual 
information asymmetry and endogenous information structures. In the interest of 
tractability and illustration and without loss of generality, we make several 
simplifications by assuming: λ = ½, V(q) =  q
α where α∈ (0,1), and  θ i is uniformly 
distributed.  
 
  174.1 PNN: Contracts that Deter Information Acquisition from Both Agents 
We first consider the terms of the contract type that the regulator uses to deter 
information collection by both types of landowners.  In this case, the regulator 
benefits from the fact that he does not need to ensure a positive utility of the 
landowner in every state of world.   The landowner saves information collection 
expenses but possibly commits to a contract that he would not commit to if he knew 
the true state of world. Since the landowner does not gather information, production 
will be independent of θ and the optimal contract menu can be described as (TH, qH) 
and (TL, qL) for βH and βL respectively. The optimal contract that deters information 
acquisition is the solution to the problem PNN:    
s.t. 
11
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  The objective function in PNN reflects the regulator’s desire to maximize the 
expected net return from the policy when he deters information collection from either 
  18landowner by offering two pairs of (Ti,qi).  Conditions (1) to (4) are standard. (1) and 
(2) are individual rationality constraints (IRs), ensuring the expected utility of each 
landowner is non-negative. Condition (3) and (4) are incentive compatibility 
constraints (ICs) that ensure truthful reporting of the efficiency type. Condition (5), 
(6) and (7) are information acquisition constraints (IAs) that ensure that agents prefer 
to stay uninformed about θ given information collection costs r.   
It is essential to observe that the information acquisition constraints (IAs) are different 
for high and low efficiency agents.  For type L, the benefit of knowing θ is the ability 
to turn down the contract when true marginal cost is so high that the contract yields 
negative payoff (i.e. θ > θ” where θ” is the zero-profit state of world).  If information 
collection costs r outweigh expected benefits, as shown in condition (5), the 
landowner will choose to stay uninformed.  For type H, on the other hand, the benefit 
of collecting information is twofold.  (7) shows that he can use this information to 
turn down the contract if the state of world is unfavourable (i.e. θ  > θ”’where θ”’ is 
the zero-profit state of world).  This option is similar to type L in condition (5).  In 
addition, however, as shown by condition (6), he can also use this information to 
misreport his efficiency type if the state of world is unfavourable (θ > θ’, where θ’ is 
the state of world where he is indifferent between truly and falsely reporting his type). 
The first two terms of the left-hand side of (6) are the expected income after 
information acquisition and the third term is his expected income without information 
acquisition.  If the difference between them is smaller than information collection cost 
r, no information acquisition will occur. 
The contract terms when information collection is deterred are best understood 
when compared to benchmark model I, the ‘textbook’ contract that might be offered 
when the endogeneity of the information structure is not explicitly considered. 
  19Proposition 2, therefore, contrasts the solution to PNN against the ‘textbook’ second-
best solution shown in Equation (1).  
 
Proposition 2: If information collection is deterred from both agents, two fixed-
quantity fixed-payment contracts will be offered. Denote qi
NN the optimal production 
contracted and qi
** the standard second best contract shown in Equation (1). The 
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Proof: See Appendix B. 
 
Proposition 2 is illustrated by Figure 3
5.  Only in the case of r >   is the 




A r  < r <  , the contracts intended for both agents need to be modified. Within 
this cost range, a landowner of type H will be tempted to collect θ . This information 
is of value to type H because it can be used either to reject the contract or to misreport 
the efficiency parameter β
NN
B r
H.  As a remedy, the regulator has to decrease the quantity 
contracted from type H (qH) and to increase it from type L (qL), which partially 
                                                 
4 More general solution to this is V’
-1(βH) ≥ 2 V’
-1[βL +(βL -βH)(1-λ)/λ].  This is to assume there exist 
significant efficiency difference between two types of agents.  α is the Cobb-Douglas coefficient and 
measures the concavity of regulator ’s utility function. The larger α is, the smaller difference between 
βH and βL is required for the result to hold. For linear utility G=q, βL≥ βH is sufficient. 
5 We illustrate in the graph the change of contracted quantities responding to the change of r. We show 
the change in a linear fashion, but it does not have to be linear.  Same applies to Figure 4 and 5. 
  20eliminates the information value of θ. This means that compared to the second-best 
situation, less production is contracted for type H and more production for type L. 
When r ≤  , not only type H, but also type L will find it desirable to acquire θ 
under the conventional second-best contract because he can use this information to 
evaluate the option of accepting (or rejecting) the contract. Thus the information 
acquisition constraints bind more strongly and the contract terms need to be modified 
further, as shown in Figure 3. As a consequence, for r
NN
A r
 ≤ rA, production contracted 
from type H decreases and the rate of production growth decreases for type L as r 
decreases. 
 
       
























The differences between the ‘textbook’ contract and the terms of PNN highlight that 
information acquisition constraints should play an important role in contract design. 
When the regulator tries to deter both types of landowners from collecting 
information, the conventional second-best contract is only valid when information 
collection costs are high. For low information collection cost, the contract terms have 
to be altered in a way that reduces agents’ incentive to collect information. The 
  21optimal contract achieves this by decreasing the difference between the type-specific 
contract quantities. As a result, the regulator’s welfare decreases as the contract terms 
are modified away from the conventional second best solutions and the regulator’s 
welfare is non-decreasing in r. 
 
4.2 Contracts that Induce Both Types of Agents to Collect Information 
If the regulator wants to induce both types of landowners to collect information, the 
appropriate instrument is for the regulator to offer both BM-style incentive contracts, 
ensuring a higher level of rent for type H. Schedules TH(θ) and TL(θ) are offered to 
type H and L, respectively. The optimal contract is the solution to problem PII: 
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The objective function in PII is the regulator’s expected payoff.  Conditions (1) and 
(2) are individual rationality constraints (IRs), ensuring the actual utility of both types 
under all possible states of the world is non-negative. Conditions (3), (3a), (4) and 
(4a) are incentive compatibility constraints (ICs): (3) ensures that type L will not find 
  22it profitable to misreport θ  whatever the state of the world (i.e. pretending to be θ’ ) 
while truthfully reporting his type βL (by choosing TL(θ) and qL(θ)). (3a) on the other 
hand ensures type L will not find it attractive to misreport θ  even when misreporting 
his type (by choosing TH(θ) and qH(θ)). Conditions (4) and (4a) are analogous for type 
H. Conditions (5) and (6) are information acquisition constraints (IAs) for type L and 
H respectively. The left-hand sides of (5) and (6) are the expected gain of collecting 
information, i.e. the difference between the landowner’s expected utility with (first 
term) and without information (second term).  The right-hand sides are the cost, r, of 
collecting information. Here, both agents have incentives to collect information.  We 
no longer consider in IAs the potential gain of type H misreporting his type because 
IC (4a) eliminates the possibility. We can therefore proceed to state Proposition 3, 
again contrasted against the appropriate benchmark of a standard BM contract. 
 
Proposition 3: If both agents are encouraged to collect information, the optimal 
contracts are two incentive contracts. Denote the optimal production with qi
II and the 
standard BM contract qi
BM as shown in Equation (2), the optimal contract has the 
following properties:  There exist two critical levels 
II




A r  
II
B r  









B r  , 
o   when a positive θ is realized  qL
II (r)< qL
BM  and ∂ qL
II (r)/ ∂ r<0  
o  when a negative θ is realized  qL
II (r)> qL
BM  and ∂ qL




BM .  
  For all r ≥  , and i=L, H 
II
B r
o  when a positive θ is realized, qi
II(r)< qi
BM  and ∂ qi
II(r)/∂ r<0  
  23o  when a negative θ is realized, qi
II(r)> qi
BM  and ∂ qi
II(r)/∂ r>0 
Proof: See Appendix C.  
Figure 4 shows how the contract design has to deviate from the standard BM results 
when a positive  θ is reported. Only for low information acquisition cost (r ≤  ) is 
the contract design problem equivalent to two separate and standard BM contracts.  
For acquisition costs in the interval [ ,  ], the IA constraint for type L becomes 
binding and its incentive contract requires modification. The contracted quantity 




































The intuition for modifying the contract term in this particular way is that – since the 
IA constraint becomes binding – the terms have to be conducive to type L’s 
information collection.  This is achieved by making that type, after collecting, choose 
a smaller production when the marginal cost is higher than expected (θ > 0) and a 
greater production when the marginal cost is smaller than expected (θ < 0).  
For higher information acquisition costs (r ≥   ), the incentive contracts offered to 
both types of landowners need to deviate further still from standard BM incentive 
II
B r
  24contracts. Because the regulator’s welfare decreases with the addition of new IA 
constraints, the regulator’s welfare is non-increasing in r.  
 
4.3 Contracts that Induce Only One Landowner to Collect Information 
For PNI, the regulator will offer type H a schedule (qH(θ),TH(θ)) while offering a FQ-
FP contract (TL,qL) to type L. The optimal contract is the solution to the problem PNI:
11
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The objective function and the constraints in PNI are similar to previous problems. 
Information acquisition constraints (5) and (6) ensure type L will have no incentive to 
collect information while type H will. The detailed analysis provided in appendix D 
gives rise to the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4: If only one type of landowner is encouraged to collect information, the 
optimal contract offers the high efficiency landowner a BM type incentive contract 
and the low efficiency landowner a fixed quantity – fixed payment contract.  
  25There exist two critical levels 
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BM and ∂ qH
NI /∂r<0 for θ > 0;   
o  qH
NI > qH
BM and  ∂ qH
NI /∂r>0 for θ < 0.  
 
Proposition 4 distinguishes between three cases. For intermediate acquisition costs 
(   ≤ r ≤  ), the contract designed for type L involves a fixed production above 
the level implied by the second-best solution and the contract designed for type H is a 
BM incentive contract. The IA constraint becomes binding for type L for r <   and 
as a result, a smaller production is contracted. This decreases type L’s total gain from 
resolving the marginal cost uncertainty and thus deters him from collecting 
information. For type H, the IA constraint becomes binding  for r >  . In that case, 
the incentive contract needs to be modified. Analogous to the reasoning underpinning 









II in 4.2, a larger production is contracted for in favourable situations 
                                                 
6 The general expression is that βL is sufficiently greater than βH such that 
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  26(θ < 0) and a smaller production in unfavourable situations (θ > 0). Figure 5 
illustrates the results  
 

























5. Concluding Discussion 
In this paper, we extend the literature on conservation contracting to contracting 
situations with endogenous information structures. In concrete terms, we examine a 
setting in which the landowner can collect contract-relevant information after being 
offered, but before signing the contract. We believe this situation is frequently 
encountered in practice and show that it requires additional contract features in order 
to manage the agency-landowner relationship efficiently, even if – such as in our case 
– precontractual information asymmetry is ‘large’ relative to additional information. 
Since the regulator has to rely on the landowner to acquire information, the welfare-
improving effect of enhancing production efficiency through additional information is 
counteracted by the potential gain in the landowner’s ability to extract additional rents 
out of the contract. The reason is that the landowner is not only potentially better 
informed about his cost, he is also the only party that knows whether additional 
  27information has in fact been acquired. If landowners’ information acquisition is 
relevant, therefore, the efficient contract must incorporate the information acquisition 
constraints in operation. 
Analytically, our approach generalizes the previous contracting literature and 
we are able to replicate the results of Cremer et al (1998a), Baron-Meyerson (1982) 
and the ‘textbook’ model of precontractual information asymmetry with two types as 
special cases. In our mixed case, both moral hazard and adverse selection problems 
are present and the trade-off between these two problems poses an interesting problem 
to the principal. As the landowner’s action of collecting information is not observable 
by the regulator, an information rent has to be offered to overcome the moral hazard 
problem. However, encouraging a landowners to learn about the state of the world 
also raises the landowner’s incentive to misreport his type. We show that the optimal 
contract terms are significantly altered relative to the special cases considered.  
A number of extensions and generalizations are possible. One obvious 
generalization is to extend the model to one where endogenous information can 
outweigh exogenous information. Another is to acknowledge that regulators usually 
have partial control over the information acquisition costs faced by the landowner by 
being able to specify a deadline for signing the contract. Does this improve the 
bargaining position of the conservation agency and if so, can it credibly commit to a 
deadline? Lastly, a regulator may decide to offer to acquire the information itself. 
When is it optimal to offer this and does this in any way improve on the contract 
terms presented here, which are compliant with the information acquisition 
constraints of the problem. These extensions would help us arrive at a richer analysis 
of the full strategy set available to conservation agencies. 
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  31Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1  
 
The existence of at least one threshold level rz that alternate optimal choices between 
GNN (for r > rz) and GII (for r > rz) is easy to prove with the monotonic non-decreasing 
and non-increasing properties of  GNN and GII respectively.   
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Z, the regulator would be able to find a W
NI contract that is 






Appendix B: Solution to PNN
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Step 1: Condition (B1) implies that θ”≥ 0. Condition (B2) can be ignored if (B1) and 
(B4) are satisfied.   
 
(B7) ensures the benefits that type H receives by rejecting contract after learning the 
true state of world information will not exceed the information collection cost r.  The 
first term on the left hand side is the expected return after rejecting contracts under 
some unfavourable true state of world. (B7) can be ignored with condition (B1) and 
assumption βL >βH + θ satisfied because: 
0 ) ( ≥ − > + − L L L L H L q T q T β θ β
This means even the worst state of world, type H will gain non-negative utility by 
choosing contract intended for type L, so he will never reject the contract after 
discovering the true state of world.  
  
 








Condition (B5) is rewritten as :
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We first consider the case that both condition (B5) and (B6) are non-binding.  PNN 
boils down to standard hidden information model and the optimal solution is 
characterized as following: 
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  34It tells the conventional story that at second best solution type H produces efficient 
amount with a rent, while type L under-produces with zero rent.  Substituting this 
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Therefore second best contract is only good when r is higher than both rA and rB under 
our setting.  For relatively large difference between βH and βL
7
,  B 
A.  A, B
B A
we find r is greater 
than r  Therefore for r ∈[r  r ], (B6) is binding while (B5) is not.  For r smaller than 
both r  and r , both (B5) and (B6) are binding. In each case, modifications need to be 




We examine the situation when (B6) is binding and (B5) is slack (for r ∈[rA, rB]).  
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Adding (B7) and (B9) we get ϕ1=1>0 (condition B1 is binding), thus θ”=0. Given 
assumption βL>βH+θ , we get ϕ3=0 (Condition B3 is non-binding)
8, therefore by 
(B8),(B9) and (B10) we have: 
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7 (restate from footnote 1 in the text) If V=q
α (α∈(0,1)) as assumed, this condition is equivalent to βL> 
[1+0.5(2
1-α-1)]βH. Therefore for sufficient large difference between βH and βL, qL**> 2qH**. 
 
8 If (A3) is binding, βL=βH +θ’ , which contradicts to βL>βH + θ  
  35From (B12-13), we conclude that when r ∈[rA, rB] (i.e. constraint B5 is slack while B6 
binding), high efficiency producer under produces and low efficiency producer 
increases her production compared to conventional second best contracts.  Since it is 
easy to see that ϕ6 is a decreasing function of r, this over production and under 




Now we examine the situation when both (B5) and (B6) are binding (for r ∈[0, rA]).  
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Solving (B14)-(B17), we get:  
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It shows that contract for type H behaves as shown in previous step 5, while type L 
further under-produces as the last term of (B20) is positive (ϕ5 is a positive and 
decreasing function of r). (B18)-(B20), together with  
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implicitly defines the general solution to PNN.  
 
 
  36Appendix C: Solution to PII  
 
Before we solve for PII, we first prove two lemmas for condition 3a and 4a.  
 
Lemma 2: Condition 3a is satisfied if and only if:  
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Lemma 3: Condition 4a is satisfied if and only if:  
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Lemma 2 states that type L will never misreport his type if his pay-off under the best 
state of the world is greater than his pay-off when misreporting under the worst state 
of the world, i.e. condition 3a is satisfied. Lemma 3 states that type H will never 
misreport his type if his pay-off under the best state of the world is higher than his 
pay-off when misreporting his type under the best state of world, i.e. condition 4a is 
satisfied. Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 together say that if type H under the worst state of 
world and type L under the best state of world have no interest pretending to be each 
other, they would not lie about their type in any realization of the state of world.  
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
 
Lemma 2:  This is to prove (3a’) is sufficient and necessary condition to (3a)  
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Necessary condition is straightforward to see. Following we prove (3a’) is sufficient 
condition of (3a) as well. 
 
Step 1:  Observation 1: “Type L under most favourable state of world situation is 
most likely to lie”.  Precisely, if there is any θ such that: 
) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( θ θ β θ θ θ β θ H L H L L L q T q T + − < + −
Then we can prove 
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Step 2:  Observation 2: “Type L will not lie if she finds no interest pretending to be 
type H under the most unfavourable state of world condition”.  Precisely, if there is 
any θ’ such that: 
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Then we can prove 
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Step 1 and 2 together prove the sufficient condition. 
 
 
Proof of Lemma 3 
 
This is to prove (4a’) is sufficient and necessary condition of (4a).  
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Necessary condition is straightforward to see. Following we prove (4a’) is sufficient 
condition of (4a) as well. 
 
Step 1:  Observation 1: “Type H under the most unfavourable state of world situation 
is most likely to lie”.  Precisely, if there is any θ such that: 
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Step 2:  Observation 2: “Type H will not lie if she finds no interest pretending to be 
type L under the most favourable state of world condition”.  Precisely, if there is any 
θ’ such that: 
) ' ( ) ( ) ' ( ) ( ) ( ) ( θ θ β θ θ θ β θ L H L H H H q T q T + − < + −
Then we can prove 
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Step 1 and 2 together prove the sufficient condition. Q.E.D. 
 
 
It is well known (Baron-Myerson, 1982, Rochet 1985) that conditions (3) and (4) are 
satisfied if and only if : 
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(3’) and (4’) show that the landowner’s rent can be reduced either by lowering Ui(θ ) 
or reducing qi(θ) (see Crèmer et. al. 1998a for further discussions). 
 Therefore we can rewrite problem PII as: 
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Step 1:  According to the parameter assumption βL >βH + θ , constraint C2’ is ignored 
if C1’ and C4a’ are satisfied. 
 
Step 2: Constraint C1’ is binding at optimum. 
 
Step3: Integrate (C3’) by part and take expectation, we get: 
ds F q q T E L L L L ) ( ) ( )) ( ) ( ) ( ( θ θ θ θ β θ
θ
θ ∫ = + −
This is the first term of constraint C5.  Therefore C5 and C6 can be rewritten as: 
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Step 4: Substitute (C3’) and (C4’) into the objective function we get  
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In (C10), the first term is standard Baron-Myerson solution. The second term, which 
represents the information acquisition constraint, is positive when positive θ is 
realized and negative when negative θ is realized.  Therefore for negative θs, 
production is going to be greater than Baron-Myerson; for positive θs production is 
smaller than Baron-Myerson type contract; and there is a discontinuity at θ=0.  This 
result corresponds to Cremer et. al. (1998a). 
 
Condition (C4a) is binding (ϕ4>0) which shows that for the optimal contract, type H 
should find herself indifferent between contract intended for type L under the most 
favourable state of world condition and contract for herself when the state of world 
situation turns out to be the most unfavourable.   
 
Now let us categorise the solution with different ranges of information collection cost 
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Where rA is smaller than rB




condition (5) and (6) are nonbinding, both of agents get Baron Myerson contracts.  
When r ∈ [r , r ], condition (5) is binding while (6) is not, which means contracts for 
type L needs to be modified in Cremer sense to induce him to collect the information. 
When r ∈ [ r , +∝], both condition (5) and (6) are binding and both agents get 
modified Baron Myerson contracts. 
 
That rB is greater than rA implies it is easier to induce type H to collect information 
than type L. When r ∈ [rA, rB], without additional incentive provided by distorting the 






                                                 
9 Let Q(θ) = qL(θ)-qH(θ).  rA-rB = 
∫ ∫∫ − − = − +
0 0
0 )] ( ) ( )[ ( ) ( ] 1 ) ( [ ) ( ) (
θ θ
θ
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ d Q Q F d Q F d Q F . The second equation is 
derived using change of variable.  The question now boils down to check the monotonicity of Q(θ) 
within [θ ,0] as -θ is always greater than θ on [θ ,0].  
Let’s write W as the inverse function of V’. So q (θ) = W(β+2θ-θ).  Q’(θ) = W’(βL+ 2θ-θ) – 
W’(βH+2θ-θ) = 1/V’’(qL) –1/V’’(qH).  From the assumption of positive V’’’, we have increasing V’’, 
therefore Q’(θ) is positive, which implies Q(θ) increasing. Therefore rA-rB is negative.  
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Step 1:  According to the parameter assumption βL >βH + θ , constraint D2 is ignored 
if D1 and D4a’ are satisfied. 
 
Step 2: As previously shown, constraint D3 is non-binding. 
 
Step3: Rewrite Constraint D5 and D6 into 
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In (D12), the first term is standard Baron-Myerson solution. The second term, which 
represents the information acquisition constraint, is positive when positive θ is 
realized and negative when negative θ is realized.  Therefore for negative θs, 
production is going to be greater than Baron-Myerson; for positive θs production is 
smaller than Baron-Myerson type contract; and there is a discontinuity at θ=0.   
 
Condition (D4) is binding (ϕ4>0) which shows that for the optimal contract, type H 
should find her indifferent between the FQ-FP contract intended for type L and the 
incentive contract when the state of world situation turns out to be the most 
unfavourable. The first two terms of (D13) correspond to this point. However, when 
the information constraint comes into play (ϕ5>0), under-production problem is 
deteriorated, which is shown by positive sign of the last term in (D13). 
 
Now let us categorise the solution with different ranges of information collection cost 
r.   The threshold points are rA and rB defined as following
10: 
                                                 
10 This is calculated as previous by setting ϕ5=0 ϕ6=0.  By (D8) and (D10), we have ϕ1=1>0 therefore 
θ’’=0..  rB is the same as (B6’’).  
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Where rA is smaller than rB when βL is sufficiently larger than βH
11 (See footnote for 
proof).  When r ∈ [rA,  B
A
B
r ], both condition (5) and (6) are nonbinding, type H gets 
standard Baron-Myerson type incentive contract and type L receives a FQ-FP 
contract.  When r ∈ [0, r ], condition (5) becomes binding, which means contracts for 
type L needs to be modified by decreasing the contracted production (equation D13). 
When r ∈ [ r , +∝], condition (6) becomes binding and type H’s contract needs to be 
modified depending on the realization of θ - positive θ implies less contracted 
production and negative θ implies more.  
  
                                                 
11 When βL is sufficiently greater than βH, qL is sufficiently smaller than qH. rA and rB are non-
decreasing functions of qL and qH, hence rB > rA.  
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